摘要
委托-代理理论是目前公司治理研究中的主流分析框架,也是指导实践的一个重要理论根据。以代理理论作为分析工具来探析现金股利与公司治理之间的关系,得出如下结论:公司治理在根本上就是对代理问题的治理;而现金股利能够缓解代理冲突,发挥公司治理效应;现金股利与公司治理的有效结合能够降低代理成本,提高公司治理效率。
Agency theory is the main analysis framework for corporate governance and important tool in designing corporate govemance mechanism. This paper investigates the relationship between cash dividend and corporate govemance based on agency theory. The conclusion is that corporate governance is fundamentally aimed to solve the agency problem, and that cash dividend will alleviate agency conflicts. So cash dividend can work as a means of governance. Thus, the effective combination of corporate govemance and cash dividend policy will lead to lower agency cost and higher governance efficiency.
出处
《石家庄经济学院学报》
2009年第2期58-62,共5页
Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics
基金
2007年度河南省哲学社会科学规划项目"基于公司治理的股利政策动因分析"阶段性成果(2007FJJ028)
关键词
代理理论
公司治理
现金股利
利益侵占
agency theory
corporate governance
cash dividend
control right benefit seizing