内部审计与企业风险管理的互动机理分析——基于动态博弈的视角

An Analysis of the Interactive Mechanism of Internal Audit and Enterprise Risk Management from the Perspective of Dynamic Game

在美国金融危机背景下,企业风险管理和内部审计受到理论界和实务界高度关注。但众多研究很少分析内部审计与企业风险管理互动过程中的核心主体行为,而且在探讨互动机理时往往忽略制度环境因素的影响。本文把企业风险管理和内部审计涉及到的核心主体统一在一个两方的完全信息序贯博弈模型中,规范地考察内部审计与企业风险管理的互动对内部审计和风险管理质量的影响,提出核心主体双方进行决策应选择的具体条件,并对博弈均衡的动态优化过程以及制度环境的影响进行分析,从监督机制、奖惩机制及声誉机制方面提出对策建议。

Under the background of American financial crisis, enterprise risk management and internal audit gain unprecedented attention of the academic and business world. Among all the studies, there are still some limitations： Few research has been done on the behavior of the core personnel concerned in the interaction between internal audit and enterprise risk management, and the influence of systematical and environmental factors has always been ignored in the study of the interactive mechanism between enterprise risk management and internal audit. This paper attempts to combine core personnel related enterprise risk management and internal audit in a two-part sequential game model under complete information, so as to study how the interaction between enterprise risk management and internal audit influences the quality of internal audit and enterprise risk management. The paper also proposes specific conditions necessary for the decision-making of the core personnel on two parties, analyses the process of dynamic optimization in the game equilibrium and the influence of corresponding system environment, and finally, comes up with some policy suggestions.