摘要
明确了电力企业并购的特点,指出了谈判在企业并购中的重要性。介绍了轮流出价的讨价还价博弈理论,并引出了其中的鲁宾斯坦(Rubinstein)模型和外部选择的概念。接下来在自由竞争的电力市场中,结合鲁宾斯坦讨价还价模型,在存在外部选择(大型火电企业在与一家小型火电企业进行并购谈判的同时,还有另一家小型火电企业愿意以固定的并购价格与此大型火电企业完成并购)的情况下,分析了大型火电企业与小型火电企业为确定最终的并购价格而进行的轮流出价谈判过程。分析结果表明,轮流出价的讨价还价博弈理论可以很好地协调发电企业并购中谈判中双方的价格分歧,并最终得到并购双方都满意的均衡并购价格。
The concept of Merger＆Acquisition （M＆A） and the characteristics of electric power industry are shown, and the importance of negotiation in M＆A is pointed out. Then the bargain game theory and Rubinstein model are introduced. Furthermore, under the background that the merging enterprise has external choice, the negotiating process to determine the M＆A price is analyzed using the Rubinstein model in perfect competitive market. At last, the authors give a conclusion that the bargain game theory surely can be used to make the M＆A price.
出处
《华北电力技术》
CAS
2009年第5期17-20,共4页
North China Electric Power
关键词
发电企业
并购
博弈论
鲁宾斯坦模型
外部选择
自由竞争电力市场
power generation enterprise
Merger＆Acquisition
Game theory
Rubinstein model
external choice
perfect competitive market
