基于上下游的完全信息动态博弈反倾销模型

Anti-Dumping Model by Dynamic Game Analysis with Perfect Information Based On Upstream and Downstream Monopoly Market Structure

根据我国某些垄断行业的真实情况,基于上下游均为垄断企业的市场结构和本国市场的斯塔克伯格均衡,运用逆向归纳法解出社会福利最大化时的最优反倾销税率,并分析了最优反倾销税率的决定因素及这些因素对社会福利的影响。得出结论认为最优税率受市场容量,国内上下游垄断企业和国外上下游垄断企业的市场竞争力的影响。

According to the real situation of some monopoly industries in China, this paper establishes a dynamic game model with perfect information based on upstream and downstream monopoly market structure and Stackelberg model used in domestic market, meanwhile employs backward induction solution to solve the equilibrium and get the optimal anti - dumping tax rate. It analyzes factors that influence the optimal rate and how they impact on the social welfare. Conclusion can be drawn that the optimal rate will be influenced by market size, enterprise competitiveness of domestic upstream and downstream monopolies and foreign ones.