中国人在行政纠纷中为何偏好信访？

Why the Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation

近些年,中国民众在解决行政纠纷时往往会选择信访,而不进行诉讼。对此现象,学术界主要有两种解释:一种认为"信访现象"根本就是民众理性选择的结果,行政诉讼问题过多,效果不如信访。另一种则认为清代的法律文化与1978年以前的新中国历史使当代中国人具有"厌讼"或"信人治不信法治"的历史传统,或叫"路径依赖"。本文认为这两种解释都与现存的证据存在很大出入:首先,信访的效果比诉讼差得多,很少会解决信访者的问题。其次,传统中国社会——尤其在清代和民国——并不很厌讼。在此基础上,本文提出一种新的解释可能:中国民众不选择行政诉讼是因为对这种诉讼的程序感到陌生和排斥。不论古今,中国民众都似乎偏向冲突性较低、法官主导功能较强的诉讼程序和审理方式,而现代的行政诉讼制度因为不允许调解,也许显得过于生硬、冲突性过强,因而使访民产生排斥心理。

In recent years,the Chinese public,when facing disputes with government officials,have preferred a non-legal means of resolution,the Xinfang system,over litigation.Some scholars explain this by claiming that administrative litigation is less effective than Xinfang petitioning,while others argue that the Chinese have historically eschewed litigation and continue to do so habitually.A closer examination of contemporary and historical data indicates that both explanations are questionable:Xinfang petitioning is,in fact,much less effective than litigation,and very rarely solves the petitioner's problem.Moreover,traditional Chinese societies,particularly those in the Qing and Republican eras,did not display significant anti-litigation tendencies.This paper proposes a new explanation:Chinese have traditionally litigated administrative disputes,but only when legal procedure is not too adversarial and formally allows for the possibility of reconciliation through court-directed settlement.Since this formal possibility does not exist in modern Chinese administrative litigation,people feel uncomfortable with it.