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我国期货交易所与经纪公司的信息博弈分析——对期货市场过度投机的一个解释 被引量:7

Analysis of Information Game bewteen China's Futures Exchange and Broker——An Explanation of Excessive Speculation of Futures Market
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摘要 在过度投机的市场环境下,由于期货交易所与经纪公司各自的监管取向偏好不同,对影响市场投机信息的把握尺度也迥异,这就在交易所与经纪公司之间产生了信息博弈。对交易所与经纪公司之间信息博弈的分析表明,过度投机行为屡禁不止的根本原因并非仅源于经纪公司的"逐利偏好",还源于经纪公司因生存考验而表现出的对交易所的"主动示好",从而赢得交易所的"良心庇护"。因此,只有协力打击过度投机行为,强化市场监管合作,才能保证期货市场持续、稳定、健康发展。 In the futures market environment of excessive speculation, because there exists individual risk bias between futures exchange and broker,what's more,they hold different attitudes toward degree of speculation. So the situation results in information rivalry. Through the analysis of information rivalry between futures exchange and broker, it shows that the ultimate reason why the behavior of excessive speculation is not completely eradicated is that not only the broker biases to pursuing benefit, but also it shows active kindness considering their own survival in order to win conscience protection of futures exchange. Therefore, only the method of the two organizations striking behavior of excessive speculation together and strengthening supervised cooperation of futures market can make sure a continuous, stable and healthy development of futures market.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第5期1-4,8,共5页 Soft Science
基金 国家社会科学基金项目(08BTQ033) 教育部哲学社会科学重大课题公关项目(07JZD0010)
关键词 期货市场 过度投机 信息博弈 监管 futures market excessive speculation information game supervision
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