基于委托代理理论的家族企业激励约束机制研究

Research on Incentive and Restrain Mechanism of Family Enterprises based on the Principal-agent Theory

随着家族企业规模的扩大和社会化进程的加快,其委托代理问题备受管理界关注。在建立委托代理理论的基础上,将家族企业的委托代理关系分别归纳为:所有者(经营者)与员工、控制权股东与无控制权股东、所有权与经营权分离这三种委托代理关系,对它们进行深入分析。并提出建立一套合理的激励约束机制,对代理人进行有效的激励和监督,来解决家族企业的委托代理问题。

With the scale expansion of the family enterprises and the accelerating pace of socialization, the scholars pay closer attention to the problems rising between the principal and agents. On the basis of the principal - agent theory,the paper concluded the principal - agent relationship into three categories ： relationship between managers and employees, controlling shareholders and nocontrolling shareholders, ownership and managementship, then give an insight into these relationship. At last, the paper puts forward a set of incentive and restrain mechanisms to stimulate and supervise the agents efectively for solving the problems between the principals and agents of family enterprises.