摘要
基于信息甄别原理,分析了不对称信息下需求创新的授权,信息不对称来自对新产品的市场需求。如果采用固定费加提成的合同,对于两点离散分布,研发者对高需求情形的授权合同是单一固定费制,对低需求情形是两部制,并且有可能只对高需求情形授权最优。对于连续型分布,厂商可能只有当市场需求大于某个值时才能得到授权,且信息租金随市场规模而增加。
Based on the principle of information screening, the optimal mechanism under asymmetric information of a demand innovation of an outsider patentee who doesn＇t know the true value of the market demand is considered. When combinations of fixed fee and royalty is adopted and market demand is discrete, the innovator offers a pure fixed fee contract if demand is high, and a mixed contract if demand is low. Moreover, it maybe optimal for the innovators to license only when demand is high. When the demand is continuous, the innovator may license the firm only when the demand is bigger than a certain value, and information rent increases with the increase of demand.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第3期39-44,共6页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70473037)
关键词
专利授权
机制设计
不对称信息
逆向选择
patent licensing
mechanism design
asymmetric information
adverse selection
