基于有限理性的项目经济评价博弈行为分析

Evolutionary Game Equilibrium of Project Economic Evaluation under Bounded Rationality

在投资项目经济评价时,政府审批部门与项目实施企业两个群体之间的信息是不对称的,所以二者之间存在博弈。由于考虑的侧重点不同,博弈双方会在博弈过程中学习进化,通过试错寻找较好的策略,也即对不完全理性部分采用的是均衡策略。因此,对投资项目的经济评价,实际上是政府审批部门与项目实施企业两个群体进化博弈的过程。为此,本文基于项目实施企业和审批部门项目经济评价的有限理性,建立了有限理性条件下的博弈模型,并通过对博弈模型进化博弈稳定策略进行分析,对投资项目经济评价提出了一些对策和建议。

In the process of project economic evaluation, the information between company and Board of Censors is not symmetrical, and hence games will inevitably occur. In the meanwhile, either part will always try many times to apply a better strategy in this process to gain more interests according to their viewpoint or emphases. In this sense, project economic evaluation is the process of replicator dynamics of company and Board of Censors under bounded rationality. In this article, based on the evolutionary game theory, a evolutionary equilibrium model is offered. By analyzing the evolutionary stable strategy （ESS） of the model, some suggestions relating to the project economic evaluation of either part are brought forward in the end.