金字塔股权结构、终极股东控制与资本结构

Pyramid Ownership Structure,Ultimate Shareholder Controlling and Capital Structure

本文以2005年我国270家民营上市公司为样本,对金字塔股权结构的"内部资本市场假说"和"终极股东利益侵占假说"进行了实证检验。结果发现,金字塔股权结构复杂性与上市公司全部非银行借款率、短期非银行借款率显著正相关,即金字塔股权结构越复杂,所形成的内部资本市场规模越大,上市公司越倾向选择非银行借款,这表明金字塔股权结构确实发挥了内部资本市场的融资作用;终极股东现金流权与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关,这表明终极股东的现金流权越大,侵占其他股东利益的程度越低,避免了公司财务状况的恶化,相反,终极股东的现金流权越小,侵占其他股东利益的程度越高,从而引起公司财务状况恶化,资产负债率增加。

This paper examines ＂internal capital market hypothesis＂ and ＂ultimate shareholders invading hypothesis＂ of pyramid ownership structure by a sample of 270 listed private companies in 2005. The results show that complexity of pyramid ownership structure is significantly positively correlated with all nonbank borrowing ratio and short-term nonbank borrowing ratio. That is, the more complex pyramid ownership structure is, the larger internal capital market scale will be, so listed companies tend to choose nonbank borrowing. This indicates that the existence of pyramid ownership structure does play a role of capital market financing. The results also show that cash flow right is significantly negatively related to asset-liability ratio and current liabilities ratio. This proves that the higher cash flow right is, the lower degree of invading the interests of other shareholders will be, thus avoiding the deterioration of financial situation. On the contrary, the lower cash flow right of ultimate shareholders is, the higher degree of taking the interests of other shareholders will be, thus worsening financial situation and increases asset-liability ratio.