上市公司高管人员薪酬与经营绩效的实证分析

Empirical Analysis of Deluxe Manager's Salary of Listed Company and Its Management Performance

管理者的薪酬是上市公司激励约束机制的重要组成部分,为了验证上市公司高管人员薪酬与公司经营绩效之间是否存在依存关系,在对委托—代理理论、激励理论及其假说等理论分析的基础上,运用实证分析的方法,通过线性回归分析对上市公司高管人员薪酬与经营绩效之间的关系进行了检验。结果发现,两者间存在显著正相关关系;另外研究表明,在较小的持股比例下,高管人员持有的股份比例与公司绩效间存在正相关关系,高管人员现金薪酬与公司的规模呈显著的正相关关系。最后根据研究结果,从完善我国现有的薪酬激励结构的角度,对高管人员薪酬与上市公司经营绩效之间的关系提出了相应的建议。

The deluxe manager＇s salary is a very important integral part of listed company＇s incentive and restraint mechanisms. In order to test and verify the relation between deluxe manager＇s salary and company＇s management performance, firstly the paper carries out theoretical analysis of the commission and agency theory, and incentive theory with its hypothesis, and then it sets a foundation for the substantial evidence research to examine the relation of the salary of deluxe manager and management performance by making use of the linear related and analytical method. It is found that there exists a positive relationship in both of them. And it is also found that there is a positive relationship between the proportion of deluxe manager＇s shares and company＇s management performance, while there is a obvious positive relationship between deluxe manager＇s cash salary and the scale of company. According to the results, this paper makes some suggestions to perfeet the relation between deluxe manager＇s salary and listed company＇s management performance.