基于风险偏好的报酬契约与预算松弛研究

The Effects of Risk Preference and Compensation Contract on Budgetary Slack

风险偏好与预算松弛之间的关系是报酬契约能否有效解决预算松弛问题的重要前提。本文根据报酬契约设计中风险分摊和激励的关系,设计了三种不同类型的报酬契约,采用实验的方法研究在这三种不同类型的报酬契约下,预算下级风险偏好与预算松弛之间的关系。实验结果表明,风险偏好与预算松弛相关,但这种相关性会随着报酬契约的不同而变化。在风险分摊型报酬契约下,预算松弛的程度与预算下级的风险厌恶程度成正比;在激励补偿型报酬契约下,预算松弛程度与预算下级的风险厌恶程度成反比;在风险分摊和激励改善型报酬契约下,无论何种风险偏好的预算下级,预算松弛程度与前两种报酬契约相比会有不同程度的减少。

In this article, the value of risk preference is considered in budgetary slack with different compensation contract. We use experimental study test the effects on budgetary slack of risk preference by controlling the variable of compensation contract. It is shown that, the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack will vary with differential compensation contract. Under the compensation contract based risk sharing, the relationship will be positive correlation; under the compensation contract based incentive compensation, it will be negative correlation ; under the compensation contract based risk sharing and incentive balancing, however, budgetary slack will be reduced. The result suggested that the relationship between risk preference and budgetary slack risk preference is a necessary condition for use of compensation contract to reduce budgetary slack.