受工会影响的国际寡头竞争与环境倾销

Environmental Dumping and International Unionized Oligopolies

本文在Barrett(1994)的模型中引入工会,研究环境倾销是否为稳健的战略性环境政策,得到的结论如下:第一,在企业进行产量竞争的情况下,环境倾销是本国政府的最优政策;并且,它的程度比不存在工会情况下的环境倾销程度更大。第二,在企业进行价格竞争的情况下,本国政府的最优环境政策取决于本国工会的工资议价能力和两个企业产品的差异程度的相互作用。一方面,只要本国工会的工资议价能力充分强,本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。另一方面,给定本国工会具有工资议价能力,那么,只要两个企业产品的差异程度充分大,本国政府就会采取环境倾销政策。第三,以上讨论蕴含环境倾销可以成为对有工会的国际寡头竞争市场的稳健的战略性环境政策。

This paper studies whether environmental dumping is a robust environmental policy recommendation toward international unionized oligopolies. We introduce trade unions to Barrett （1994） model and show that： （i） When firms compete as Cournot competitors, govemments engage in environmental dumping policies; and the extent to which environmental taxes deviate from the Pivogian taxes is bigger than in the case where there do not exist trade unions. （ii） When firms compete as Bertrand competitors, optimal environmental policies are determined by the interaction between trade unions＇ bargaining strength and the degree of product differentiation. If trade union＇s bargaining strength is sufficient; or fixing trade unions＇ bargaining strength, if the degree of product differentiation is sufficient, governments engage in environmental dumping policies. （iii） These imply that environmental dumping could be a robust policy recommendation toward international unionized oligopolies.