制度环境、交易规则与控制权协议转让的效率

Institutional Environment,Transaction Rule and Efficiency of Corporate Control Transfer

控制权协议转让的交易规则主要分为市场规则(又称私下谈判规则)和同等权利规则,市场规则是我国上市公司控制权协议转让的主要交易规则。本文认为,制度环境对交易规则有重要影响,同样的交易规则在不同的制度环境下会产生不同的效率结果。本文着重分析了公司治理的外部制度环境(以下简称制度环境)对市场规则成本的影响,通过建立成本分析模型对比了市场规则在不同制度环境下的成本差异。结果表明,在较差的制度环境下,市场规则会导致较高的交易成本,制度环境的改善可以降低交易成本,提高交易效率。在理论分析的基础上,本文运用上市公司的经验数据对我国市场规则下控制权协议转让的整体效率进行了检验,实证结果验证了理论分析的结论。本文的政策含义是,交易规则与制度环境之间缺乏必要的耦合将导致资源配置效率的降低。

The legal rules governing the transfer of corporate control include market rule （MR） and equal opportunity rule. Market rule is the primary rule of corporate control transfers in China. This paper suggests that institutional environment has crucial itdluence on the transaction rule. The same rule under different environment institutes different effect. Accounting for the difference of governance environment, this paper establishes a comparative cost model for analyzing the costs of market rule under different governance environments. Our analyses suggest that under a poor governance environment, the market rule incurs high transaction cost. Improvement of institutional environment may reduce transaction cost and raise efficiency of resource allocation. Based on the data of sales of corporate control in China, we find the evident to support the hypothesis. Our research supports the view that without the coupling of institution environment and rule, the trade will incur high transaction costs, which reduce the efficiency of resource allocation.