道德风险、沉淀成本效应与软预算约束

Moral Hazard,Sunk Cost Effect and Soft Budget Constraints

作者从事后信息不对称——道德风险角度,借助于沉淀成本效应再次解释政府对大型国有企业软预算约束行为,从而扩展了公有产权结构、动态承诺不一致,以及政策性负担等经济解释,进一步认识到解决软预算约束根本在于消除沉淀成本效应,而克服委托代理情况下的道德风险行为是最为根本的,因而设计恰当的制度安排显得十分重要。

The author reexplains the soft budget constraints of the government to major stage - owned enterprises from the aspect of information dissymmetry after the event moral hazard based on the sunk cost effect, thus expands the economic explanation of the inconsistency of public property right structure and dynamic promises and burdens resulting from policy, further realizes the basis of solving the problem of soft budget constraint lies in getting rid of sunk cost effect and getting over moral hazard in the case of consignment agency is the most fundamental. Hence it is very important to design appropriate institutions.