委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制探析

An Analysis of the Incentive Mechanism for Evading Risk Investors'Moral Hazard Under the Condition of Principal-Agency

委托代理条件下规避风险投资家道德风险一直是学界研究的热点和难点问题之一。由于风险投资家和风险资本家之间的信息不对称,特别是风险投资家难以察觉的私人信息使风险投资契约达成后风险资本家面临道德风险。本文以激励理论为指导,从中国风险投资实践的客观现实出发,初步探析了一个有关规避风险投资家道德风险的激励机制,作为风险投资契约不完备性的补充与完善。

Evading risk investors＇ moral hazard under the condition of principal-agency has always been one of the hot and hard issues in the academic circle. The asymmetric information between the risk investors and the risk capitalists, especially the private information which is hard to be observed by risk investors, makes risk capitalists face moral hazard after the risk investment contract is signed. Guided by the incentive theory, starting from the reality of risk investment in China, the author explores an incentive mechanism for evading risk investors＇ moral hazard as the supplement and perfection of risk investment contracts.