证券监管机构与基金管理者的进化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis of stock market supervisor and fund managers

为了改善目前我国证券监管机构与基金经理之间的"严格监管-守法经营-不严格监管-违规经营"的死循环,采用进化博弈的方法对证券监管机构与基金管理者之间的博弈进行了分析,发现在一定的条件下没有进化稳定策略,基金管理者的违规经营与守法经营两种策略交替出现,无法消除基金管理者的违规经营,针对这种情况,提出了大力发展基金公司与机构投资者;加大对违规经营的基金管理者的处罚力度;减少监管机构采取严格监管时额外增加的成本;加强对监管机构不作为行为的督促与处罚.

In order to improve the endless loop of the present situation＂ strict supervision-management obeying the law-no strict supervision-the contrary management＂ between our country＇ s negotiable securities supervision organization and fund manager, this article carries an analysis on the gambling between the negotiable securities supervision organization and fund managaners, using the evolutionary gambling method. It discovers that under certain condition, it＇s hard to eliminate the fund superintendent＇s contrary management without an stable strategy, while the fund superintendent＇s management obeying law and management disobeying law appear alternately. In view of this kind of situation, this article proposes the following improving measurement： enconraging the development of fund company and institutional investors ; enlarges the punishment to the contrary management fund superintendents; reducing the extra cost when the strict supervision is adopted;strengthening the supervision and the punishment on the supervision organization whey they don＇ t fulfill their responsibility.