摘要
中国公立的研究型大学存在多重委托代理关系:国家与学校的委托代理关系、学校与教师的委托代理关系、教师与学生的委托代理关系。针对高校普遍存在的三重委托代理关系中的教师与学生委托关系,本文分别通过建立静态、动态博弈模型进行分析,并得出一个基本的结论:激励机制有效的关键是存在恰当的第三方。
There are multiple principal- agent relationships in Chinese public research universities: the principal - agent relationship between the state and school, the principal- agent relationship between school and teachers and the principal- agent relationship between teachers and students. For the principal- agent relationship between teachers and students in the three principal- agent relations which widespread in colleges and universities, this article respectively uses the static and dynamic game models to make analysis, and comes to a basic conclusion that the key to an effective incentive mechanism is the existence of appropri- ate third-party.
出处
《财经科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第6期117-124,共8页
Finance & Economics
关键词
高校管理
三重委托代理关系
博弈模型
Management of universities
Three principal- agent relations
Game model