基于进化博弈论对我国金融监管协调机制的解读

An evolutionary game theory interpretation of China's financial supervision mechanism

应用进化博弈理论透视中国人民银行与三家金融监管机构的监管协调行为,以及对我国金融监管协调效率进行考量,得出的基本结论是,当前我国金融监管协调机制处于低效率状态,监管各方在博弈过程中存在"搭便车"现象。金融监管合作与否的收益初始状态设置,在一定程度上决定了监管主体的策略选择。因此,通过建立金融监管协调委员会,加强信息共享和强化监管协调的法律约束手段,从根本上改变监管初始状态,为金融监管各方的协调博弈创造良好的制度环境。

By using the evolutionary game theory., the paper analyzes the supervisory cooperation between the PBC and the other three regulatory bodies and the efficiency of this cooperation. The conclusion is that the cooperative mechanism between these institutions is of poor efficiency due to the hitchhiking problem in the functioning of the related parties. The initial level of the benefit of cooperation in financial supervision to some extent determines the choice of the regulatory parties. Therefore the introduction of a financial supervisory cooperation committee would strengthen intormation sharing and the law entorcement means of supervisory cooperation, thus changing the initial level of the benefit of supervisory cooperation fundamentally and providing a robust institutional environment for the cooperation gaming of all supervisory parties.