养殖污染最优配置的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Optimal Allocation of Breeding Pollution

单个养殖户的最佳污染水平处于边际环境损害成本等于边际污染控制成本的均衡点处。多个养殖户的最佳污染水平处于各自的边际污染控制成本的均衡点处。在没有政府或第三方介入的情况下,制定一个强制性协议对于实现污染控制的纳什均衡是非常必要的。

The optimal pollution level of one breeding farmer is at the equilibrium point at which marginal cost of environment damage is equal to marginal cost of pollution controlling.The optimal pollution level of multiple breeding farmers is at the equilibrium point of their marginal cost of controlling pollution.If the government or the third party doesn＇t intervene,it is necessary to lay down a compulsory agreement for getting the Nash equilibrium of controlling pollution.