“我”是谁——从维特根斯坦的角度看

On Wittgenstein's Conception of the I

我的神秘在于:无所不在又无处可寻。早期和中期的维特根斯坦,基于先验的或现象主义的理由,通过消除我来消除这一神秘。后期(包括中后期)的维特根斯坦则认为,我是无法消除的;虽然我们可以从语言使用的角度知道"我"是谁,却无法知道"我"如何指向了我,也不能知道我是谁。维特根斯坦的相关说法可以合理地看成是康德相关论述的语言学继续。

The phenomenon of I poses a fundamental paradox for philosophers talking about the mind. The consciousness of the I seems to accompany virtually all human subjective experience, but at the same time, nowhere could one apprehend the I deliberately. In order to resolve the paradox, the early and middle Wittgenstein suggests eliminating the I notion from transcendental and phenomenological stances respectively. ~ In his later period, however, Wittgenstein no longer views the I notion as redundant. Instead, he proposes a reference for ＂I＂ to the speaker who use it, though grammatically the ＂I＂ is not a referiential term, and in general situations the speaker does not know exactly who he or she is. For the author of the present study, Wittgenstein~ conception of the I could be read largely as an updated version of similar notions of Kant that is articulated form the linguistic point of view.