关联交易、代理冲突与中小投资者保护

Related-party Transaction,Agency Conflicts,and Minority Investor Protection

本文全面分析了2002-2006年间我国上市公司关联交易总体状况,证明了非公允关联交易与上市公司价值之间具有负相关关系。在此基础上,以非公允关联交易的规模作为中小投资者受侵害程度的代理变量,分析了股权结构、"自我约束"机制以及法治环境对于中小投资者保护的影响。实证结果表明,关联交易的发生规模与第一大股东持股比例正相关,与股权制衡能力负相关,中小投资者因上市公司的"政治关系"而受损;境外交叉上市、聘请外部董事的"自我约束"机制以及法治环境的改善、市场化进程的加快可以有效约束控股股东对于中小投资者的掠夺。

Based on analyzing related-party transactions of Chinese listed firms during the period of 2002-2006, this paper finds that the potentially harmful related-party transactions is negatively correlated with listed company＇ s Tobin＇ s Q. Using the value of a firm＇ s potentially harmful related-party transactions as a proxy for the degree of expropriation, we analyzes the effects of ownership structure, bonding mechanism and law environment on minority investor protection. The empirical study finds that the scale of related-party transactions is positively correlated with the share proportion controlled by the largest shareholder and negatively correlated with counter-balance towards the largest shareholder. Minority investors suffer form listed companies＇ political connections. The bonding practices including listing the companies in foreign stock exchanges, having outside directors and increasing proportion of fixed assets, as well as improving law environment and promoting commercialization process could restrain the controlling shareholders＇ expropriation of minority investors.