摘要
建立了报废汽车回收过程中政府与汽车回收责任体的博弈模型,分析了博弈双方的稳定性条件,揭示博弈双方的行为特征及其对稳定状态的影响.结果表明:汽车回收责任体回收的成本与收益、政府对企业的奖惩力度以及政府监督成本是影响博弈结果的主要因素.
The evolutionary game model between the government and the retrieving enterprises was derived to analyze the stability conditions of the both parties and to reveal their behaviors and the effects on their stability. The factors directly affecting the game result are the cost and benefits of the retrieving enterprises, severity of the reward and penalty system, and the supervision cost of the government.
出处
《西南交通大学学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第3期421-425,共5页
Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University
基金
“十一五”国家科技支撑计划资助项目(2006BAH02A09)
重庆市社科基金资助项目(2006-JJ18)
关键词
报废汽车
回收
监督
进化博弈
scrapped automobile
retrieval
supervision
evolutionary game