次贷危机中房贷经纪商道德风险治理问题研究--从控制权配置的角度探讨

The Governance on Moral Hazard of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis——A Perspective from the Allocation of Right of Control

近来在各方对次贷危机的反思中,次贷经纪商的道德风险开始受到政府、学界的关注。本文分析了经纪商、贷款公司、借款人三方的共同代理关系,指出次贷市场上经纪商不合理的佣金制是导致这一共同代理问题的症结所在。由于在原共同代理模型内求解无效,本文尝试为经纪商设计一个新的激励报酬支付形式,即由贷款公司向经纪商支付报酬,变共同代理为传统的双边代理,并通过比较改变控制权后私人收益和社会福利的增减,进一步表明由贷款公司发放激励报酬、获得对经纪商行为的控制权能够改善对经纪商道德风险的治理,增进贷款公司收益和社会福利。

The moral hazard of mortgage brokers is attracting more and more attentions from U.S. government and scholars. The paper analyzes the joint agency relationship among brokers, mortgage companies and borrowers and points out that the problem lies in the unreasonable commission arrangement for brokers in the subprime mortgage market. Since it is ineffective to solve the problem under the traditional joint agency framework, the paper attempts to design a new incentive framework, under which mortgage companies are responsible for paying brokers to switch the joint agency to bilateral agency. By compar- ing the change of private earnings and social welfare before and after the switch of right of control, the paper further justifies that when mortgage companies pay for the compensation and obtain the right of control on broker＇s behaviors, the governance on moral hazard of brokers is improved and the social welfare and earnings of mortgage companies are increased too.