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多冲突环境下的多目标双矩阵对策集结模型 被引量:5

Integration model of multi-objective bimatrixgames in multiconflict situations
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摘要 针对两人多冲突环境,建立了多个多目标双矩阵对策的综合集结模型.基于局中人所受到的约束条件,构造局中人面向多冲突环境的可行策略串集合,以全体局中人的可行策略串集合建立新的结局空间,分别构造局中人在新结局空间上所有目标下的合成结局支付函数,建立多冲突环境下的多目标双矩阵对策综合集结模型;运用熵权法对集结模型中的多个目标进行加权和,将集结模型转化为单目标双矩阵对策进行求解.给出的例子说明了模型的实用性和有效性. To the two-person multi-conflict situations, the synthetic aggregation model of multi-objective bimatrix games is established. Based on the restrict conditions, the feasible strategy string sets of the players for multi-conflict situations are constructed and a new outcome space is established using all the players' feasible strategy string sets. Then the synthetic outcome payoff function values for all objectives are calculated, and the synthetic aggregation model of multiobjective bimatrix games under muliti-conflict situations is established. Using the Entropy weight method, the aggregation model can be solved by transforming it into a single objective bimatrix game. Finally, an example is provided to illustrate the model.
出处 《华中科技大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2009年第6期32-35,共4页 Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60774029 70471031)
关键词 多目标双矩阵对策 集结模型 多冲突环境 对策集结 策略串 multi-objective bimatrix game integration games strategy string model muliti-conflict situations integration of
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参考文献9

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二级参考文献9

共引文献6

同被引文献38

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