电子产品三级逆向供应链定价与激励机制研究

Study on Price and Incentive Mechanism of Three-level Reverse Supply Chain for Electronic Products

研究了由制造商、维修中心和零售商构成的三级逆向供应链模型的定价策略与激励机制。模型扩展了正规维修中心的职能,使其作为回收处理中心参与到逆向供应链中,负责分类处理零售商回收的废旧电子产品,一方面将其中可再利用部分经过维修销售到二级市场中,另一方面将可再制造部分由制造商进行再制造成新产品。应用博弈论得到模型的Stackelberg均衡解和合作机制下的最优解,并设计了线性分成机制和基于不对称Nash协商模型的激励机制。最后,通过数值仿真验证结论并讨论了价格弹性系数和可再制造率。研究结果表明,回收价格和系统收益均与弹性系数成正比,且较高的可再制造率可得到较高的回收价格和收益。该研究对逆向供应链的运营实践具有很好的指导意义和参考价值。

The paper studied the price decisions and incentive mechanism of the three-level reverse supply chain （RSC） model included a manufacturer, a maintenance centre and a retailer. The model expanded the functions of the maintenance and made it participate into the RSC as the recycling centre which was responsible for classification and disposal of waste electronic products recycling from the retailer. Not only sold it the re-used parts of waste products to the secondary market after maintaining, but also sent the re-manufactured parts to the manufacturer for furbishing as new ones. Stackelberg equilibrium and cooperative optimal solution were obtained by game theory,and a linear separation mechanism and an incentive mechanism based on asymmetric Nash negotiation model were designed. Finally, the conclusions were validated by numerical simulation,and the elasticity coefficient of price and re-manufactured rate were discussed. The results indicate that recycling price and system profit are both proportional to the elasticity coefficient,and higher re-manufactured rate can gain higher price and profit. The study in this paper has ＇good guiding significance and reference value for the practice and operation of RSC.