代理人状态不可验证契约纳什实施惟一性分析

Research on Nash equilibrium implementing uniqueness of contract with nonverifiable agent types

围绕代理人逆向选择导致委托人无法直接识别代理人类型状态,研究真实状态下委托人契约实施惟一性问题。分析讨论了完全信息下委托人的最优契约和逆向选择下的次优契约,建立了信号空间上的纳什均衡与有效配置的映射关系,并推广到逆向选择问题中的类型空间,将委托人契约与代理人状态联系起来,最后研究分析委托人契约纳什实施惟一性问题。研究表明,委托人提供的完全信息下最优契约不具备纳什实施惟一性,而满足代理人激励相容约束的次优契约具备纳什实施的惟一性,并为合理、有效的激励契约设计提供了检验途径。

The Nash equilibrium implementing uniqueness of contract with nonverifiable agent types is researched in the true state. The first-best contract with complete information and the second-best contract with incomplete information are discussed based on a comprehensive review of the related literature. Based on Nash equilibrium in the signals space, the contract and the agent type is connected, then the uniqueness of Nash implementation on the first-best contract and the second-best contract is studied. As a result, the second-best contract can be Nash implemented uniquely in nonverifiable agent types, but the first-best contract cannot be done, which is offered as a test method for efficient incentive contract design.