劳动力市场、效率工资博弈模型及其经济效用分析

Labor Market、Efficiency Wages Game Model and Its Economic Effects

本文分析了效率工资的索洛模型和Shapiro-Stiglitz模型存在的局限性,认为由于工资合约具有非完备性特点,通过工资合约对员工进行完全激励是困难的;基于重复博弈理论构建了同时考虑内外部劳动力市场要求的效率工资模型,运用博弈理论分析了企业和员工在效率工资博弈过程中的行为和策略,阐述了效率工资的经济效用,尤其是具有的"事前激励"和"事后激励"两种效率价值;揭示了该模型比均衡效率工资模型具有的更为丰富的经济内涵,认为效率工资需要与其他激励机制相互补充才能实现其激励目的。

Solow Model and Shapiro-Stiglitz Model have limitations. It is difficult to incur labor work hard using a wage contract for its uncompleted characteristic. The paper puts forth a efficiency wages model based on game theory. The model has more economic effects contents than equilibrium efficiency wages model. Using game model, this article analyzes some kinds of behavior and strategies in the course of playing game between employer and labor. Efficiency wages model needs complementary with other incurring mechanisms. Efficiency wages has two kinds of efficiency values of beforehand and afterwards incentiwes.