上游垄断条件下纵向一体化的排斥效应——中国铝业公司案例分析

Repelling Effect of Vertical Integration under Upstream Monopoly——The Case of CHINALCO

基于中国铝业公司纵向并购的环境和行为特征,构建"上游寡头竞争、下游完全竞争"的两阶段博弈模型,对纵向一体化的排斥效应进行了分析。结论认为,中铝并购电解铝企业对其他独立下游企业具有明显的排斥效应,但这种排斥效应随中铝在上游部门垄断程度的降低而变弱,而纵向并购在一定程度上缓解了变弱程度。中铝纵向一体化的长远目标是尽可能控制铝土矿稀缺资源,并层层利用上游垄断的纵向排斥效应,最终在技术含量高的铝深加工环节上形成垄断优势。

Based on the environment and characteristic of vertical merger in CHINALCO, this paper establishes a two-stage model with an upstream monopoly and a downstream competition, and analyses the repelling effect of vertical integration. The model suggests the forward integration of CHINALCO has obvious repelling effects, hut the repelling effect becomes smaller with the reduction of upstream monopoly, and the vertical merger alleviates the diminishing degree. The long-range goal of vertical integration in CHINALCO is to controls the bauxite mining as far as possible, and forms the monopoly advantage on fabrication processes and products using the foreclosure of upstream monopoly one by one.