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融入公平偏好的天使投资委托代理模型 被引量:6

Principal-agent Model of Angel Investment Based on Fairness Theory
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摘要 天使投资对创业企业融资方面的重要性日益彰显,本文依据委托代理理论,建立天使投资中多委托人委托代理模型,并将公平偏好理论融入模型中,分析多委托人框架下的最优激励机制,并对天使投资中创业者搭便车的行为进行理论分析。研究表明,公平偏好因素会改变传统委托代理模型的许多结论,而创业者搭便车的行为是不可避免的,但是公平在某些条件下会减少搭便车的行为。 Angel investment has demonstrated its growing significance in corporate financing. This paper extends a multiprincipals principal-agent model based on theory of principal agency, incorporates fairness preference to analyze optimal incentives mechanism in frame of multi-principals, and analyses the behavior of free-riding of entrepreneurs. The research shows that fairness preference changes a lot of conclusions drawn from the traditional model, and the risk of mutual free- riding behavior of entrepreneurs is inevitable, but fairness can lessen this risk on certain conditions.
作者 王颖 饶育蕾
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第5期72-76,共5页 Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872111 70672106)
关键词 公平偏好 委托代理 搭便车 多委托人 天使投资 Fairness Preference Principal-agent Free-riding Multi-principals Angel Investment
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献41

  • 1阮青松,黄向晖.西方公平偏好理论研究综述[J].外国经济与管理,2005,27(6):10-16. 被引量:22
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