摘要
天使投资对创业企业融资方面的重要性日益彰显,本文依据委托代理理论,建立天使投资中多委托人委托代理模型,并将公平偏好理论融入模型中,分析多委托人框架下的最优激励机制,并对天使投资中创业者搭便车的行为进行理论分析。研究表明,公平偏好因素会改变传统委托代理模型的许多结论,而创业者搭便车的行为是不可避免的,但是公平在某些条件下会减少搭便车的行为。
Angel investment has demonstrated its growing significance in corporate financing. This paper extends a multiprincipals principal-agent model based on theory of principal agency, incorporates fairness preference to analyze optimal incentives mechanism in frame of multi-principals, and analyses the behavior of free-riding of entrepreneurs. The research shows that fairness preference changes a lot of conclusions drawn from the traditional model, and the risk of mutual free- riding behavior of entrepreneurs is inevitable, but fairness can lessen this risk on certain conditions.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2009年第5期72-76,共5页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872111
70672106)
关键词
公平偏好
委托代理
搭便车
多委托人
天使投资
Fairness Preference
Principal-agent
Free-riding
Multi-principals
Angel Investment