库存竞争性产品的VMI收益分享合同模型

Inventory competitive products' revenue-sharing contract under VMI

库存竞争性产品的需求依赖于该产品货架展示量.重点就VMI环境下经营库存竞争性产品的供应商和零售商的决策过程,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析.结果表明:当库存竞争性产品具有非库存弹性性质(即库存弹性系数小于1),需求的随机扰动因子为均匀分布时,存在唯一博弈均衡,使得分散式供应链双方最终达成收益分享合同;但该合同无法协调供应链,分散式系统的渠道期望收益始终低于集中式系统的渠道期望收益;与供应商相比,零售商享有更多的供应链渠道收益;利润率较低或者库存弹性较高的库存竞争性产品,更适宜在VMI环境下采用收益分享合同,进行分散的供应链管理.

The demand of inventory competitive product depends on the displayed inventory on the shelves. In this paper we mainly model and analyze the decision making of a supplier and a retailer who procure and sell the inventory competitive product under VMI as a Stackelberg game, and show that they will sign the revenue-sharing contract while there exists a unique equilibrium, assuming that the inventory competitive product is inventory inelastic （inventory elasticity index is less than 1）, and its demand＇s random disturbing factor follows the uniform distribution. However, the contract is unable to coordinate the supply chain, and the expected channel profit of decentralized system is always less than the centralized one＇s. Compared with the supplier, the retailer shares more （expected） channel profit of the supply chain. The inventory competitive product with lower profit rate and higher inventory elasticity is more suitable to use revenue-sharing contract under VMI to manage the decentralized supply chain.