环境污染博弈问题的系统动力学模型

System dynamics model for mixed-strategy game of environmental pollution

用系统动力学建立环境污染管理问题中政府管理部门与生产排污企业之间的一个混合战略重复博弈模型,考虑信息延迟和环境的污染量净化问题进行模型的仿真。结果表明,环境污染问题中政府管理部门与生产排污企业之间博弈的Nash均衡实际上很难达到稳定,尤其是在考虑信息延迟的情况下。最后提出一种简单可行的双重惩罚策略,既可以促使博弈双方尽快达到Nash均衡,也能有效地改善环境污染问题。

Considering the information delay and environment pollution depuration, a system dynamic model for a mixed-strategy game between the government who manages environment pollution and the enterprise who produces with contamination generates. The simulation result shows that it takes a long time to reach the Nash equilibrium of the government and the enter- prise, and the paths for the equilibrium states are filled with oscillations especially in the condition of information delay. Therefore, suggested a double.punishment for the equilibrium stabilization and the improvement in environmental pollution.