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科层组织中的合谋:理论发展与应用研究前景 被引量:1

Collusion in Hierarchical Organization:Theoretical Development and Future Research of Application
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摘要 组织中的合谋是经济和社会中常见的现象。组织合谋理论是多层次委托代理理论在最近20年重要的发展。本文对组织合谋理论进行了文献梳理和评介,扼要刻画了合谋防范原理,并考察了该理论近来的国内外研究状况和应用前景。 That collusion in hierarchical organization is a common phenomenon in economy and society. Organizational Collusion theory is one of the important results from the development on multi-level agency theory in the latest two decades. This paper gives a survey and some comments on organizational collusion theory with illustrating principles of collusion-proof contract briefly, and describes the current developments in research and the future of practical research direction.
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第6期83-87,共5页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词 合谋 经济组织 防合谋均衡 委托-代理理论 collusion economic organization collusion- proof equilibrium agency theory
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参考文献28

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二级参考文献82

共引文献79

同被引文献10

  • 1田瑛,廖肇辉.合谋激励与国有商业银行改革[J].南开经济研究,2006(2):105-121. 被引量:5
  • 2董志强,严太华.监察合谋:惩罚、激励与合谋防范[J].管理工程学报,2007,21(3):94-97. 被引量:19
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