代理人类型差异及其委托代理的实证分析

An Principal-Agency Model Based on the Type Difference of Agent and Its Empirical Study

标准化的委托代理模型并未对代理人类型差异问题进行针对性研究。本文从代理人机会主义倾向存在程度差别的现实判断入手,对基于代理人类型差异的委托代理治理问题进行了尝试性分析。通过对标准化委托代理模型的简要评价以及拓展分析,我们从理论层面证明,区分代理人类型的合约机制,对抑制代理人机会主义倾向从而提高委托人可保证收入或剩余收益等方面具有比较优势。论文利用中国上市公司数据对主要结论所做的实证检验发现,大多数上市公司偏好从内部选择代理人,这种状况在一定程度上显示,从内部选择代理人的决策在短期内有可能提高企业资本投入的回报率。

The standard model of principal and agency didn＇t do special study on the issue of type difference of agent, based on the realistic jugdement of the degree of the agent＇s opportunism, this paper do a trial study on the governance of the issue of principal and agency founded on type difference of agent. Through the brief appraisal and expanded analysis of the standard model of principal and agency, we prove on a theoretical view that the contract based on the type of agent has comparative advangtage in the restraining the agent＇s opportunism and rising the principal＇s pledgeable income. The empirical study based on the data of the Chinese listed companies tells us that most listed companies has strong clination to choose agents within companies, and the decision of choosing interior agent is in favor of rising the return of capital input in a short run.