政府间税收分权的配置选择和财政影响

Allocation Choice and Fiscal Influence of Intergovernmental Tax Decentralization

长期以来,在财政分权领域,税收分权研究没有引起足够的重视。本文归纳和比较了中央政府和地方政府关于税权配置的四种契约形式:定额合同、分成合同、分税合同和代征合同。分别研究在地方财政、中央财政和国家财政收入最大化目标下,中央政府和地方政府关于税收努力和最优税权配置选择的三个命题,说明中央政府在选择政府间税收分权形式时,时常面临加强中央财政收入集中与扩大国家财政收入规模的一对矛盾。1994年分税制改革蕴含的政府间税收分权契约变化,是由财政包干制下的分成合同和定额合同为主的税收分权,向分税制下分税合同为主的税收分权转变。这是推动十多年来中国税收高速增长、且使中央财政集中程度保持稳定的重要原因。

On the field of fiscal decentralization study, the study about tax decentralization has long been neglected. This article sums up and compares four contract models about tax decentralization between central government and local government, which are fixed rent contract, share contract, tax sharing contract and agent levying contract. On the aim of respectively maximizing local, central and national fiscal revenue, the article gets three propositions about the tax endeavor and tax decentralization, and proves that central government often faces the choice to maximize the scale of national fiscal revenue or to strengthen the centralization of central government fiscal revenue. The change of tax decentralization in 1994 is from fixed rent contract and share contract dominant contract to tax sharing contract dominant contract, which inpels high tax growth and keeps central government revenue concentration rate stable from then on.