基于拍卖-谈判的多因素多物品采购机制设计

Multi-attributes multi-unit procurement mechanism design based on auction-bargaining

设计了一种先"拍卖"再"谈判"的两阶段机制,以实现更有效率且更符合实际的多物品采购运作.该机制的设计充分考虑到,采购组合拍卖中同时存在的价格竞争和质量竞争,以及供应商与采购商的私有信息披露问题.证明了机制中拍卖阶段的激励相容和个体理性;给出了机制中谈判阶段需要满足的三个条件,并分别为企业采购和政府采购设计了满足上述条件的垄断谈判和纳什谈判机制.分析发现,此两阶段机制在拍卖阶段实现了激励相容和个体理性的预分配方案,在满足谈判各方个体理性的前提下,在谈判阶段实现了分配效率的改进.

A two-stage mechanism for more efficient and practical combinatorial procurement operations is designed, which implements first combinatorial auction then renegotiation. The mechanism, in multi-item procurement situation, deals with price-quality competition and suppliers＇ （buyer＇ s） information revelation problem severely. The paper shows that the machanism holds incentive compatible and individual rationality in the ouction stage; three criteria for the renegotiation function are presented, and monopolistic-bargaining and Nash-bargaining functions satisfied these criteria are designed for enterprise procurement and government procurement respectively. Especially, under all parties＇ individual rationality, the renegotiation allocation improves the efficiency of pre-allocation from auction.