基于Salop模型的网络企业横向并购研究

Research about horizontal merger of network companies based on Salop model

基于Salop圆周城市模型,对网络外部性存在下的市场自由进入与企业横向并购问题进行了研究.论文考虑了并购对成本所产生的影响,通过数值模拟分析了网络外部性对市场均衡结果的影响,将企业竞争与并购理论在网络经济中进行了拓展.研究表明:网络外部性越强,则市场集中度越高,网络企业为了获得更高的利润,具有较强的动机进行横向兼并;市场集中度越高则社会净福利越大,最优行业结构为完全垄断.最后,论文对网络经济下企业竞争范式的转变进行了探讨.

Based on the Salop circular city model, the paper studies the problem about the free entry and enterprise＇ s horizontal merger in the markets with network externalities. The paper analyzes the impacts of network externalities on market competition equilibrium by data simulation analysis. The paper considers the influence of merger on cost function, and extends the enterprise competition and merger theories. Research results show： the market centralization degree increases with network externalities strenthening, and network companies have the strong motivation to carry out horizontal merger; the social welfare increases with the market centralization degree increasing, and so the optimal industry structure is monopoly. At last, the paper discusses the competition form in the industries with network externalities.