基于非对称信息的企业经理人股权激励的博弈分析

Game analysis of corporate manager′s equity incentive based on asymmetric information

运用博弈论、信息经济学的基本原理对企业经理人的股权激励机制进行了分析,探讨了企业产出与经理人的努力水平之间的关系,对所有者授予的经理人的股权数量、经理人的努力水平以及影响股权激励机制的外部不确定性因素进行了研究,并在信息不对称基础上引入股权激励的监督机制,分析了所有者和经理人各自的收益函数,得出所有者监督的最优概率和经理人努力的最优概率,并认为所有者的监督效率对股权激励机制的有效执行有重要意义.

The corporate manager＇s equity incentive mechanism was analyzed by using the basic tenets of game theory, information economics. The relationship between the enterprise outputs and the manager＇s effort level is researched, and the manager＇s awarded number of shares, the manager＇s efforts level and the external uncertainty factors which influence the equity incentive mechanism are analyzed. The equity incentive supervisory mechanism is introduced based on asymmetric information, and of their respective income function of owners and managers is analyzed, the optimal probability of owner obtained and managers is obtained. It is painted out that the efficiency of the supervisions have great significance to the implementation of incentive mechanisms.