双边道德风险与风险投资的资本结构

Double moral hazard and the theory of capital structure of venture capital financing

研究创业者和风险投资家双边道德风险下的融资合约,创业者无初始财富,风险投资家在提供资本支持的同时也扶助企业发展.模型存在贝叶斯均衡解的充分必要条件是,双方的努力互补,且从极大似然原理看,创业者在企业的发展中发挥了关键性的作用.由此内在地导出了风险投资企业的资本结构,仅在某个利润水平之上创业者才能获得普通股,而风险投资家持有可转换优先股.

This paper analyzes financial contract between an entrepreneur without initial wealth and a venture capitalist （VC） who invests venture and assists its development as well, so the double moral hazard problem exists between them. Under the sufficient and necessary conditions that the two parties make complementary efforts, and from the perspective of the maximum likelihood, entrepreneurs play a key role in developing the venture, the financing problem＇ s solution arises as a Bayesian equilibrium. Therefore, this paper derives endogenously the capital structure of venture capital financing in which the entrepreneur gets common stocks only when the profit exceeds a certain level and the VC holds a convertible preferred stock.