期刊文献+

更替成本约束下的CEO最优解聘时机模型

Model on Optimal Dismissing Time to CEO Based on Switching Cost
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摘要 任何一个公司在发展过程中都无法回避CEO的变更,这是公司最重要的战略决策之一。本文利用占线决策理论构建了最优解聘时机选择模型,并提出最优解聘时机选择方案,利用"竞争比"说明该方案的有效性。尔后考虑了继任CEO延迟到来的情形,同样给出了最优解聘时机选择方案及其竞争比。最后进行了数值分析,为企业所有者更好地建立CEO更替机制提供理论依据。 CEO turnover is one of the most strategic issues. This paper utilizes the online theory to establish the model on optimal dismissing time to CEO. The optimal strategy about dismissing time is given, which is proven to be optimal with the competitive ratio. Furthermore, considering the delay time of succeeded CEO, we present the other optimal strategy about dismissing time, together with the competitive ratio. Some numerical examples are given to help the owner of enterprise to perfect the CEO turnover mechanism.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 北大核心 2009年第3期162-166,共5页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 山东省自然科学基金重点资助项目(Z2007H04)
关键词 占线决策 CEO更替 更替成本 解聘 online theory CEO turnover switching cost dismissing
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参考文献9

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