期刊文献+

终极控制股东两权偏离与企业绩效:公司治理的中介作用 被引量:12

Rights Departure of Ultimate Controlling and Firm Performance:The Mediating Effect of Corporate Governance
原文传递
导出
摘要 基于2004年~2006年中国上市公司截面数据,应用回归分析的方法,系统考察终极控制股东两权偏离、公司治理与企业绩效间的互动机理,检验公司治理在两权偏离与企业绩效关系中的中介效应。研究结果显示,终极控制股东两权偏离对公司价值具有显著的负向效应,其负向效应随终极控制股东现金流权比例的提高而趋于降低;终极控制股东两权偏离对公司治理具有显著的负向效应,其负向效应随终极控制股东现金流权比例的提高而趋于降低;公司治理对公司价值具有显著的正向效应,其在终极控制对公司价值的作用机制中具有显著的中介效应,中介效应占总效应的比例超过50%,终极控制股东现金流权比例的提高会降低公司治理的中介效应。基于实证分析结果,最后为优化公司治理提出相应的政策建议。 Using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2006, with the method of regression analysis, the paper explores an empirical study on relation-ship among rights departure of ultimate controlling, corporate governance and firm performance, and tests the mediation effect of corporate governance. Some important results are : rights departure of ultimate controlling has a significant negative impact on the firm's performance, and the effect declines with the rising of cash-flow rights. Rights departure of ultimate controlling has a significant negative impact on the corporate governance, and the effect declines with the rising of cash-flow rights. Corporate governance has a significant positive effect on corporate performance, and a significant mediating effect on the affecting mechanisms between rights departure and firm performance, and the effect declines with the rising of cash-flow rights. Finally, the paper provides some proposals to improve corporate governance in ultimate-controlled companies.
作者 张耀伟
出处 《管理科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2009年第3期9-16,共8页 Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金(70802031 70802049 70502024 70802030 70532001) 国家社会科学基金(07CJY001)~~
关键词 终极控制 两权偏离 公司治理 现金流权 ultimate controlling rights departure corporate governance cash-flow rights
  • 相关文献

参考文献24

  • 1Berle A, Means G. The Modem Corporation and Private Property [ M ] . Macmillan : New York, 1932:355 -356.
  • 2Jensen M C, Meckling W H. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure [ J ] . Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4) :305-360.
  • 3Shleifer A, Vishny R. A Survey of Corporate Governance [ J ] . Journal of Finance, 1997,52 ( 2 ) : 737 - 783.
  • 4La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Corporate Ownership around the World [ J ]. Journal of Finance, 1999,54(2) :471-517.
  • 5Grossman Sanford, Oliver Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4) :691-719.
  • 6Barclay M, Holderness C G. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporation [ J ]. Journal of Finan- cial Economics, 1989,25 ( 2 ) :371-395.
  • 7Johson S, La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. Tunneling [ J ]. American Economic Review, 2000,90(2) :22-27.
  • 8南开大学公司治理评价课题组,李维安,程新生.中国公司治理评价与指数报告--基于2007年1162家上市公司[J].管理世界,2008,24(1):145-151. 被引量:37
  • 9唐宗明,蒋位.中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J].经济研究,2002,37(4):44-50. 被引量:598
  • 10Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations [ J ] . Journal of Financial Economics, 2000,58 ( 1- 2) :81-112.

二级参考文献143

同被引文献232

引证文献12

二级引证文献73

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部