装备价格结构性规制研究

A Study of the Structural Price Regulation of Weaponry

在社会经济福利最大化和企业可持续生产前提下，提出了军工企业的拉姆塞定价模型，在此基础上分析了完备信息假设下的静态价格结构性规制机制，并进一步提出了信息不完备条件下动态的装备价格结构性规制机制，从而可以部分地优化企业的外在约束，对于解决装备生产企业的逆向选择问题具有一定的意义。

In conditions of maximum public welfare and the sustainable production of the manufacturer, the paper proposes the Ramsey pricing model of military enterprises. The paper analyzes the static structural price regulation mechanism under the assumption of complete information, and furthermore puts forward the dynamic structural regulation mechanism under the assumption of incom- plete information. Accordingly it can partly optimize the external constraints. The dynamical expansion of the V-F mechanism will be of great significance to solve the problem of adverse selection.