转型时期家族企业治理模式选择的政治经济学

Political Economy of Governance Mode Choice of Family Firms during Transition Period

文章分析了中国转型时期家族企业治理模式的选择。家族企业究竟采用关系型治理还是采用规则型治理取决于其对两种治理模式的收益和成本的权衡,市场作用和地方政府作用会对这种权衡产生影响。我们在理论模型基础上的比较分析表明,在某些条件下地方政府的作用会使得家族企业在治理模式上更容易倾向于选择关系型治理,而在另一些条件下地方政府的作用会使得家族企业在治理模式上更容易倾向于选择规则型治理,这反映了家族企业治理模式选择的政治经济学。

The paper analyzes the governance mode choice of family firms during transition period which depends on the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of relation-based governance and rule-based governance. Our theoretical analyses show that the effects of local governments will make family firms apt to adopt the relation-based governance mode under some conditions, and the rule-based governance mode under other conditions, which reflects the political economy of governance mode choice of family firms.