街头官僚在公共政策执行中的偏差及矫正

Deviation and Correction of Public Policy Implementation by the Street Bureaucrats

街头官僚理论是近些年公共行政学理论的一个前沿领域。处于公共政策执行末梢环节的广大街头官僚生存于公共政策执行资源稀缺和公共服务弹性需求的夹缝之中,出现绩效目标异化,表现出典型的行动逻辑——激励不足、规则依赖、投机行为和一线弃权,在公共利益权威分配的过程中产生执行偏差。矫正街头官僚政策执行偏差的主体路径包括3个方面:(1)政策执行机构(街头官僚机构)的内部改革;(2)政策执行直接主体(街头官僚)的自我优化;(3)政策执行间接主体(目标团体)的问责监督。

The theory of street bureaucrats is a frontier in the area of theoretical public administration studies in recent years. The vast street bureaucrats who are in the peripheral link of public policy implementation survive between the scarcity of resources and the elastic demand, and show the typical actions--lacking of incentives, rules relying, speculative behavior and first-line abstention and bringing about deviations in the process of public interests allocation. There are three paths to rectify the deviations. First of all, we should reform the policy gencies internally. Second, the street bureaucrats themselves should be more self-optimized. Third, they need accountability and oversight by the target groups.