摘要
在理论上,关于可转债的发行动机可以归结为五类,即基于不对称信息框架的理论、基于代理问题框架的理论、基于税收优势的理论、基于管理者自利的理论和基于权益市场配给额度的理论。在截面数据检验的过程中,基于信息不对称和代理成本的理论得到较多的支持,另三种理论却鲜有支持。而代表实业界观点的问卷调查得出的可转债发行动机是可转债的低利率及权益的溢价,这与理论动机大相径庭。可转债发行动机在理论、实证检验和问卷调查三方面形成差异的原因值得继续研究和探索。
In theory, the motives of issuing convertible bonds can be classified into five categories: theories based on an asymmetric information framework; theories based on an agency problem framework; tax- advantage- based theories; theories based on managerial entrenchment and rationing in the equity market. The theories based on an asymmetric information and agency problem have been investigated in the cross - sectional studies, but the other theories find very little support. The survey studies have found that practitioners issue convertible bonds because of their low coupon rate and the equity premium. This is quite different from the theoretical motive. The discrepancy in the motives of issuing convertible bonds among theory, practice and survey is worth further studies.
出处
《集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2009年第3期26-31,共6页
Journal of Jimei University:Philosophy and Social Sciences
关键词
可转换债券
信息不对称
代理成本
管理者自利
convertible bonds
asymmetric information
agency cost
managerial entrenchment