垄断竞争、利益集团与贸易战

Monopolistic Competition,Interest Groups and Trade Wars

本文借助Grossman and Helpman（1995）提出的贸易战模型，研究了在垄断竞争情况下，大国双方在产业内贸易上所实施的均衡进出口政策。结论表明，利益集团的产生将使政府在“最优进出口关税”的基础上调整贸易政策安排，利益集团将在贸易政策上得到政府更大力度的支持；并且，政府偏向于将优势产品集中于本国消费，对差异化程度较高的产品实行高水平的进出口壁垒；同时，利益集团将引发两国之间的贸易战，政府对政治捐献偏好的增加、产品竞争力的增强将单方面地提升贸易战规模，产品差异化的扩大将带动贸易战的全面升级。

This paper analyzes the import and export policies executed by two large countries under monopolistic competition in the framework of the G-H Trade War Model （1995）. Several results come from our analysis. The preferences of interest groups affect the optimal levels of tariffs in both countries. Both governments are inclined to keep the products of advantageous positions for domestic consumption, and set higher import and export tariffs for products of higher degrees of differentiation. Interest groups contribute to the occurrence of trade wars between the two countries, and the weight put by the government on political contributions and the competitiveness of a country＇s products drive up unilateral trade wars. Finally, higher degrees of product differentiation intensify trade wars.