摘要
中国式分权的独特内涵在于经济分权同政治集权的紧密结合。本文在此背景下系统地考察了环境规制与FDI流入间的关系,并利用1994-2006年的省级面板数据对理论推断进行了计量检验,得出的主要结论是:政治集权下主要基于经济绩效的地方官员考核制度决定了地方政府的目标函数具有"重经济绩效、轻公共服务"的特性,经济分权下的地方政府为最大化目标函数将有动机以放松环境管制为手段来吸引更多的FDI流入。这提醒我们需要重新审视中国式分权对地方政府治理结构的影响。
The paper investigates the environmental regulafion's impacts on FDI after viewing the local government in analysis model, and empiricaly tests the theoretical hypothesis by provincial panel data from 1994 to 2006. The main findings are: as the local officials' performance evaluation system maialy lying in economic performance under political centralization, the local government's target-function has the characteristics of "attaching importance to economic performances and ignoring public services", so economic decentralization leads local government through loosening environmental regulation to attract more FDI for maximizing the utilities.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第4期1-7,共7页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
西南政法大学科研基金资助项目(08XZ-QN-26)
关键词
政治集权
经济分权
FDI竞争
环境规制
political centralization
economic decentralization
competition for FDI
environmental regulation