投资机会集与盈余管理相关性实证研究

Empirical Study on the Relativity between IOS and Earnings Management

引入投资机会集的概念,采用理论分析和实证检验相结合的方法,选取制造业494家上市公司作为样本,分析了企业成长性对盈余管理的影响。实证结果发现,我国企业管理层与股东之间的报酬-绩效契约已经形成,投资机会集与盈余管理存在相关性,但符号结果不一致。通过分析可知,由于选取样本的年份具有特殊性,2007年的上市公司报告收益激增,管理者不得不将超额的利润递延到未来会计期。

This paper introduces the concept of IOS, selects 494 listed companies in manufacturing industry, and analyzes the influence of the growth potential on earnings management with theoretical and practical methods. The practical results discover that the reward-performance contract between managers and shareholder＇s has already been formed; The relationship between Investment Opportunity Set and earnings management is in existence though the result of signal is in disagreement. It＇s known through analysis that the managers have to delay their excess returns to the future because the data selected is during 2007, which is specific with the securities business rising sharply and stimulates the report earnings into proliferation.