国际环境合作与贸易关联的博弈分析

Linkages between International Environmental Cooperation and Trade: A Game Theory Analysis

国际环境合作被认为是解决全球环境问题的有效途径。将贸易与环境议题相关联被认为可以促进国际环境合作,从而不仅解决全球环境保护的困境,还能实现贸易自由化与国际环境合作的协调发展。对不同贸易博弈类型与环境"囚徒困境"博弈类型关联后博弈的纳什均衡结果分析表明,不同博弈类型下的贸易博弈更容易得到合作纳什均衡结果,而与环境关联后合作的利益大小及利益的平衡分配是决定关联博弈合作纳什均衡的关键。贸易合作的丰厚利益为国际环境合作的达成提供了可能性,但贸易与环境的关联博弈使原本复杂的贸易问题更加复杂,因此合作的达成也更加困难。

International environmental cooperation is regarded as an effective means ot tackling the global environmental problem. Linking trade and environment is deemed to be able to promote international environmental cooperation, thus tackling global environmental protection and achieving balanced development of trade liberalization and international environmental cooperation. This paper analyzes the Nash equilibrium of linked games for different trade games and environmental ＂ prisoner＇s dilemmas＂. It is found that trade games are more likely to gain cooperative Nash equilibrium and the size and balanced distribution of interests after linking trade and environment are the key that determines cooperative Nash equilibrium. Juicy interests in trade cooperation afford possibility of international environmental cooperation. Games linking trade and environment, however, further complicate the issue of trade, making it more difficult to achieving cooperation.