机构投资者具有监督作用吗?

Do Institutional Investors have Monitoring Effect?

本文以2002年到2005年我国上市公司再融资中流通股东的分类表决制为研究背景,对我国机构投资者的监督能力进行分析。结果发现在市场对再融资行为持反对态度的情况下,基金持股与再融资否决结果显著正相关,券商持股与再融资否决结果不显著相关,从而表明基金利用了手中的投票权并对方案否决产生关键作用,但券商作用不显著。进一步的研究发现基金的表决具有理性特征,以再融资表决结果和基金持股比例构建的交互项与公司未来两年的业绩显著正相关,反映出基金支持了优秀公司的再融资诉求。该结论支持了以基金为首的机构投资者的壮大有利于上市公司治理结构的完善。

Based on the classified voting system of SEO from 2002 to 2005, the paper studies the monitoring function of the Chinese institutional investors. Firstly, the authors examine the stock market responds to finns＇ equity financing proposals and find that there is significant positive reaction after announcement with vetoing an equity financing proposals. Secondly the authors find that the funds vote against equity financing, but the securities don＇t do so. Further analysis finds that the high - level fund holdings with approved equity financing proposals have better future performance. The evidence is consistent with the view that institutional investors play an active role in corporate governance and in controlling the insider expropriation through equity financing.